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THE ECONOMICS OF BASING POINT PRICING
GEoRGE W. SToCMNG*
Basing point pricing, adopted by steel producers some fifty years ago and since
by many other industries, has been a subject of vigorous controversy among lawyers
and economists for a quarter of a century. The clash of views has raised temper-
atures to the point of incandescence and has eventually shed some light on an intri-
cate and significant problem. In the light, all economists have not seen the problem
alike, but they have lined up on opposite sides of an issue, the general nature of
which is fairly clear. That issue is whether basing-point pricing results from inde-
pendent decision-making by business rivals, each anxious to maximize his earnings,
or from conspiracy. A parallel issue is: what should be done about it? The second
issue has forced students to look at the economic consequences of basing point
pricing as well as its causes. Moreover, as the controversy has sharpened the issues,
it has also narrowed the differences. Thus it has made for intellectual progress.
CONSPIRACY V. SPONTANEOUS EVOLUTION
The late Frank A. Fetter, Vernon Mund, and Fritz Machlup have been the
most articulate "members" of what may be called the "conspiracy school."1  John
Maurice Clark has been by all odds the most articulate proponent of what may be
called the doctrine of "spontaneous evolution." He has found strong allies in
Melvin G. de Chazeau, Theodore Yntema, and Arthur Smithies.'
'A.B. 1918, University of Texas; A.M. 1921, Ph.D. 1925, Columbia University. Chairman, Depart-
ment of Economics and Business Administration, and Director of the Institute of Research and Training
in the Social Sciences, Vanderbilt University, since 1947. Author, THE OIL INusTRY AND THE COM-
PmTITIVE SYSTEM (1925); TiE POTASH INDUSTRY (193I); co-author, PaIcE RESEARCH IN THE STEEL AND
PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES (939), CARTELS IN ACTION (1946), CARTELS OR CoaMEaTIoN? (1948). Con-
tributor to various professional journals.
'Cf. FRANK A. FETrER, THE MAsQuERADE OP MONOPOLY (931); The New Plea for Basing-Point
Monopoly, 45 J. PoL. EcoN. 577 (1937); Exit Basing Point Pricing, 38 Am. ECON. RV. 815 (1948);
VERNON MUND, OPIEN MARKETS, esp. x65 ff. (1948); Monopolistic Competition and Public Price Policy,
32 AM. EcON. RaV. 727 (942); Application of Economic Analysis to Antitrust Law Policy, PRoCEr-
INGS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE PACIFIC COAST ECoNOMIc ASS'N 75 (Dec. 1941); The
"Freight Allowed" Method of Price Quotation, 54 Q- J- EcoN. 232 (1940); FRITz MAcH.up, THE
BASING-POINT SysTEM (1949).
' Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CAN. J. ECON. AND PoL. Sci. 477 (938); Imper-
fect Competition Theory and Basing-Point Problems, 33 Am. ECON. REV. 283 (1943); The Law and
Economics of Basing Points: Appraisal and Proposals, 39 AM. EcoN. REV. 430 (1949); Machlup on the
Basing-Point System, 63 Q. J. ECON. 315 (949). I MELVIN G. DR CHAZEAU, CARROL R. DAUGHERTY,
AND SAMUEL S. STRrTON, THE ECONOMICS OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 533-578, esp. 537 (1937).
De Chazeau concludes that although in the beginning rivals cooperated in establishing and maintaining
the basing point system, the underlying technological characteristics of the steel industry, plus the
formation of the United States Steel Corporation in i9oi, "made it certain that a basing-point system
of prices would be adopted for rolled products." Id. at 537. He also states that "agreement is not a
necessary condition of uniform pricing under oligopoly." II id. at 631.
i6o LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Each of these two groups has a logical theoretical basis for its position. The
conspiracy school-particularly Fetter and Mund-relies largely on the logic of
competitive pricing; the spontaneous evolutionary school, on the logic of oligopolistic
pricing Neither group rejects wholly the logic of the other; they differ in apply-
ing it to somewhat obscure industrial facts.
A. The Logic of the "Conspiracy School"
The conspiracy school contends that the systematic practice by business rivals of
quoting delivered prices at any destination equal to the lowest combined base price
and freight charge to that destination is itself evidence of conspiracy and should be
prohibited by law. The implied remedy is mandatory f.o.b. pricing.4  As stated
above this conclusion is based on the logic of competitive pricing. According to
this logic as expounded by Mund, no seller of a standardized product will accept
less from any buyer than he can get from any other buyer; no buyer will pay to
any seller more than he need pay any other seller. The rivalry of sellers, each
trying to get as much as he can for what he sells, and the rivalry of buyers, each
anxious ,to pay as little as possible for what he buys, will force all sellers to sell
to all buyers at the same price in the same market. The "principle of indifference"
prevents discrimination. Delivered prices will consist of the f.o.b. price plus freight
to the delivery point. They will differ solely by differences in transportation costs.
In competitive markets there may be several production centers which compete for
business on the margin of their normal market areas. Relative production costs
and transportation rates will determine the boundaries of the competing markets.
These may shift from time to time in response to changes in the conditions of
supply and demand. But as Mund puts it, "The prices in two different market
places . . . do not differ, except temporarily, by more than transportation costs
and handling charges, for competing traders will ship goods and level off the price
differential."5  According to Mund, four conditions are essential to this kind of
pricing: (i) freedom of competition in trading; (2) freedom of entry; (3) a willing-
ness by producers to compete; and (4) a market demand that warrants more than
See also United States Steel Corporation, TNEC Papers (1940), in three volumes, especially Volume
III, TE BASING-POINT MFTrson. Volume I, EcoNomc Am RELATE SruDIEs, states in a foreword: "The
work of an economic nature was under the direction of Professor Theodore 0. Yntema of the Univer-
sity of Chicago. He also acted as a consultant on the economic issues considered in the study of the
Basing Point Method." The analysis of Volume I, EcoNOMIc AND RELATErD STuDiEs, lends support to the
de Chazeau thesis. Smithies, 4spects of the Basing-Point System, 32 Am. EcoN. REV. 705 (x942).
Clark makes it clear that he uses theory as an analytical tool. "In the last analysis the conclusive
thing is not any theory as such, but an understanding interpretation of the forces actually at work in
basing-point industries. In this process theories can help or mislead, according to how they are used;
but they cannot be relied on for ready-made answers." Imperfect Competition Theory and Basing-Point
Problems, 33 A. ECON. REV. 283, 285 (i943).
' Although Fetter. Mund. and Machlup all apparently accept this remedy, they do not use precisely
the same arguments in justifying it. In citing any one of these, I do not imply that any other occupies
precisely the same position. In my judgment Machlup's is the more sophisticated logic and it is not
inconsistent with the logic of imperfect competition, of which it indeed takes account.
'Mund, Prices Under Competition and Monopoly: Some Concrete Examples, 48 Q. J. EcoN. 288,
299 (1934).
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one producer. Mund illustrates his conception of competitive pricing by a study of
the pricing of lettuce, potatoes, apples, beans, and furs in the Puget Sound area.
He found that for any one of these products bought in this market all buyers,
remote or nearby, paid the same f.o.b. price at any time. Because distant buyers
had to pay higher transportation charges, they paid higher delivered prices. As
Mund puts it, "A seller with competition . . . is effectively precluded from prac-
ticing discrimination; that is, from making a difference in prices without a cor-
responding difference in quality, service or conditions in the terms of sale; or from
not makng a difference in prices for a difference in the service rendered."6
From his analysis of competitive pricing in produce markets he concludes that
whenever sellers discriminate among buyers, they are monopolists. Where monop-
oly power grows out of location, as for example, an isolated cement plant, the
monopolist sells at high prices in his "protected" territory and cuts prices to distant
buyers (by absorbing freight) "to the extent that the plant desires the business or
that it wishes to forestall or eliminate competition."' ' But monopolies through
collusion (open or tacit) are more prevalent than single-seller monopolies, and the
basing point system is a common device for strengthening such collusion. The
different mill nets that sellers realize under it, being discriminatory, are evidence
of monopoly.
Mund made his study of competitive pricing before the recent theory of imper-
fect competition had made its imprint on the thinking of economists. More recently
he has taken account of the theory of oligopolistic pricing. He recognizes that
fewness of sellers makes collusion easier, and that small sellers through fear or
avarice may choose to follow a price leader in a market where there is a dominating
seller. At one point he concedes that, "Assuming strict rational behavior, identical
output and trade interests, a demand that is highly inelastic, and few sellers with
entry of others improbable, it is conceivable that each seller might hesitate to reduce
his price for fear his rivals would follow suit." He believes such assumptions are
highly unrealistic, however, and that if sellers act independently in markets in which
"no one person [is] so dominant as to be able to threaten or ignore the price inde-
pendence of another," competitive pricing will result. He concludes that even
where only two evenly matched sellers supply a market, if they do not conspire,
prices will be competitive-that is, equal to total unit cost in the long run, marginal
cost in the short. In brief, to Mund, discrimination means monopoly; monopoly in
markets of more than one seller means collusion; collusion means monopoly profits-
that is, prices above marginal cost in the short run, with a tendency to exceed total
unit cost in the long run. As he expresses it, "When sellers are few in number ...
the frequently found desire to form rings and combinations is most easily effected.
The power which brings, and holds, a few rivals together is simply the cohesive
Id. at 299.
Id. at 301.
'Mund, Monopolistic Competition Theory and Public Price Policy, 32 Am. Ecox. R~v. 727, 728-730
(942).
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power of private plunder." Elsewhere he raises the question, "When can a con-
cern or industry discriminate in price?" And he answers it: "It is a generally
accepted economic principle that systematic price discrimination can occur only
with monopoly. Thus the 'inherent' and 'structural' elements which, it is said,
make possible price discrimination, can logically do so only after producers have
secured monopoly by agreement upon a pricing formula."'
While Mund nowhere states his position on policy toward basing point pricing,
his reasoning seems to be: (i) conspiracy is a prerequisite to the basing point system;
(2) conspiracy is illegal; (3) therefore basing point pricing is illegal, and (4) it
should be prohibited. Machlup and Fetter reach similar conclusions.10
B. The Logic of the Doctrine of Spontaneous Evolution
Chamberlin, primarily a theorist, gave a powerful weapon to policy-makers.'1
Unfortunately it has proven a double-edged sword, wielded lustily both by those
who favor and those who fear Big Business. Opponents of Big Business have
argued that since oligopolists behave like monopolists and since oligopoly is inevi-
table, the government must regulate business in the public interest. 2  Proponents
have used the Chamberlinian doctrine as a defense in antitrust proceedings." The
essence of the Chamberlinian doctrine of oligopoly is that if only a few well-informed
sellers control the sale of any standardized product and each behaves rationally,
trying to maximize his earnings, he must take account of the total effect-direct and
indirect-of his decisions. Recognizing that his rivals will meet his lower price if
he cuts them, an oligopolist refuses to cut.' 4 Chamberlin is not quite so precise
on how oligopolists will react to price increases, but he implies that, through a
series of moves, they will settle on a uniform price that will maximize the profits
of each.j' And he concludes that "the equilibrium result is the same as though
there were a monopolistic agreement between them." 6
'Mund, The Application of Economic Analysis to Antitrust Law Policy, PROCEEDINGS TWENTIETH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE PACIFIC COAsr EcoNo I Ass'N 8o (1942).
10MAcHLup, THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM 250-251 (1949); Fetter, Exit Basing Point Pricing, 38 AM.
EcoN. REv. 815-827 (1948).XEDwAnD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, esp. c. 3 (1932).
a"A-rsts ROBERT BuRNs, THE DECLINE OF CoMPETITION 40 ff., 526, esp. 529, 589-590 (936).
13 See, for example, Brief of Respondents-Petitioners, Vol. I, Appendix A, Aetna Portland Cement
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 157 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 7th 1946); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement
Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948) passim, and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 328 U. S. 78!
(1946).
"'As Chamberlin puts it: "Since the result of a cut by anyone is inevitably to decrease his own
profits, no one will cut .. " CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note ii, at 48.
"5 He says: "When a move by one seller evidently forces the other to make a counter-move, he is
very stupidly refusing to look further than his nose if he proceeds on the assumption that it will not."
Id. at 46.
0 Id. at 48. Chamberlin recognizes that uncertainty as to how any seller will react may force
prices below the monopoly level. Paul Sweezy has argued that oligopolists will follow price cuts, but
may not follow price advances. This creates a "kink" in the demand curve confronting an oligopolist and
makes for stable prices somewhat below the monopoly level. See Sweezy, Demand Under Conditlotc
of Oligopoly, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568 (1939).
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This is the theoretical basis for the doctrine that basing-point pricing is a spon-
taneous evolution. Clark was among the first to expound basing point pricing in
terms of oligopoly.'7 He regards basing point pricing as a form of imperfect com-
petition that arises in industries in which some form of imperfect competition is
inevitable. Industries using it have four characteristics or "predisposing conditions."
(I) They produce a standardized product; (2) they produce from isolated plants
or clusters of plants scattered throughout the country, each plant or group of plants
having a local market within which the local firms have a comparative freight
advantage (a monopoly of location); (3) freight charges on the product are high
in relation to value; but not high enough to dissuade sellers from reaching out for
additional business, even if to do so they must accept a lower mill price (that is,
absorb freight) on the additional business; and (4) operating costs per unit of
output are constant over a wide range of output up to the absolute limits of capacity
-that is to say, short term marginal costs are constant and consistently below total
unit cost. For cement, of which Clark made a detailed study as consultant to
defendants in the Federal Trade Commission proceedings, marginal costs are about
half of total average costs-long run supply price including a moderate return on
investment. Other characteristics of industries in which basing point pricing has
become a matter of public policy-characteristics that Clark does not specifically
enumerate but neither does he ignore-include (I) a large fixed investment in
specialized plant and equipment; (z) below capacity operation over long periods;
(3) an inelastic demand at prices for an output less than that of the industry's
capacity; and (4) only a few sellers within any particular market.
These are the characteristics which lead firms to price on what Clark calls the
"oligopoly principle.' 8 A seller of a standardized product knows that he can get
no more for his product than any other seller, and that if he reduces his prices
his rivals will cut theirs. Thus he may gain little or no business from his rivals
by cutting prices. Where demand is inelastic, price cutting is doubly unattractive
because not only will all rivals meet the cut, but also increased sales will bring
lower gross revenue to all sellers. At the lower price each will do a lower dollar
volume of business. Where marginal costs are well below total unit cost, com-
petition which reduced prices to marginal costs would mean bankruptcy' 9 With
capital facilities fixed and specialized, below-cost selling might continue for a long
time without establishing equilibrium in the industry. Hence sellers who take
account of the total influence of their decisions on the market will not try to get
business by reducing prices. Nevertheless, in times of slack demand they are under
great pressure to increase sales. They try to do so not by cutting prices on all
1 Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CAN. J. ECON. AND PoL. SMt. 477 (1938).
"8 Clark, Imperect Competition Theory and Basing-Point Problems, 33 Am. EcoN. Rav. 283, 288 ff.
(943).
'1 Ibid. Clark says: "If they did go to marginal cost, the industry in general would go bankrupt,
being unable to cover operating expenses, let alone any return on investment." I believe this statement
is inaccurate, or if accurate, unclear. I should think that a firm's marginal costs, if constant throughout
the range of normal operating rates, would be its per unit operating expenses.
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sales, but by matching the delivered prices of their rivals in areas where they are
at a freight disadvantage. To overcome this freight disadvantage, they absorb
freight and take a lower mill-net price. It pays to reach out for business as long
as the difference between the delivered price and the freight charge exceeds mar-
ginal cost. Any price above marginal cost helps to meet overhead expenses. Self-
interest will lead a seller to accept the base price of his rival when selling in terri-
tory freight-wise nearer to his rival than to his own mill °
II
How Ti ScHooLs DIFFER
The two schools, as represented by Clark and Mund, obviously differ in two
respects. Mund believes that businessmen conspire to use the basing point system
to obtain monopoly prices. Clark believes that, acting independently, businessmen
adopt the basing point system to avoid ruinous competition. He argues that while
the basing point system tends to prevent prices from falling to strictly competitive
levels-marginal costs-it does not insure monopoly earnings.21  Either "chiseling"
or self-restraint will lead to prices that in the long run yield only a reasonable re-
turn on investment.22
Despite the clash between them, neither Clark nor Mund is wholly wrong.
Clark is on solid ground in contending that basing point prices are generally below
a monopoly level and in recognizing the usefulness of the theory of oligopoly as
an analytical tool. Mund is on solid ground in contending that basing point pricing
has generally been a part of a broader program of concerted action to restrain
competition. Clark, concerned primarily with developing a theoretical explanation
" Why fear of invasion of his "natural" market area by his rivals, who will resort to counter
freight absorption sales with ultimate reduction in earnings for everyone, will not deter any seller from
initiating such invasions is not entirely clear. If demand were distributed equally over the total market
for the product and if plants were equidistant and of optimum size, the theoretical solution would be
one of local monopoly with neither price cutting nor freight absorption. Clark, however, states: "The
possibility that an extension of A's freight-absorbing sales in B's territory will provoke an equal extension
of freight-absorbing sales by B in A's territory is far less traceable or certain; and sellers are not in
fact much deterred by this prospect. Each knows that, if he stopped absorbing freight, that would have
little or no effect in causing others to stop making freight-absorbing sales in his area, unless demand
were pressing against productive capacity." Id. at 290. This is the reverse of Clark's reasoning in
explaining why sellers will not openly cut prices. If, as Stigler avers, basing point pricing results pri-
mari'ly from geographic instability in demand and involves an ebb and flow of sales in response to
shifting centers of demand, with little or no cross-hauling, the inconsistency disappears. Stigler, A
Theory of Uniform Delivered Prices, 39 Ams. EcoN. Rav. 1143 (1949). The implications of Stigler's
theory to the contrary notwithstanding, cross-hauling with freight absorption has been a continuous
phenomenon in steel and cement at any rate-with a tendency to diminish in boom times and increase
in depression.
" See Clark, The Law and Economics of Basing Points: Appraisal and Proposals, 39 AMt. EcoN. Rv.
430, 440-441 (1949).
'2Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CANs. J. ECON. AND POL. Sci. 477, 481-482
(1938): "The actual base price policy of producers appears to be a form of compromise . . . which,
under reasonably normal conditions of demand, may be expected to yield what they conceive as a fair
return." This does not mean of course that prices are at the socially desirable level.
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of basing point pricing, has ignored the' arrangements that have helped to keep
prices above a competitive level (i.e., above marginal costs).P3
A. The Cement Case
The Federal Trade Commission found that cement manufacturers had conspired
to use the basing point system and the Supreme Court has upheld the finding.24
For purposes of economic analysis, however, the facts-which the evolutionary school
have ignored-may be more important than the law. Space permits only a sum-
mary of the facts. They are fragmentary but not meaningless. They disclose a
long and persistent record of concerted action among cement producers to limit
competition. The general attitude of producers is reflected in the oft-quoted state-
ment by John Treanor, formerly president of the Riverside Cement Company and
trustee of the Cement Institute:25
. Clark would be on sounder ground if he argued that in industries of the sort about which he
is theorizing, businessmen will collaborate to prevent competition from injuring them, and that col-
laboration may eventually develop a set of practices and a code of ethics to which they will continue to
subscribe long after their initial understanding. This would bring Clark pretty close to Mund.
Only in Clark's two most recent discussions does he recognize that concerted action has anything
to do with basing point pricing. See The Law and Economics of Basing Points: Appraisal and Proposals,
39 Aar. EcoN. RaV. 430 (1949), and Machlup On the Basing-Point System, 63 Q. J. EcoN. 315, esp.
317 (1949).
Clark now implies, without specifically saying so, that conspiracy may play a considerable role. But
he implies also that the making of prices (that is, the actual setting of base prices) as distinct from the
method of pricing merely reflects independent decisions by oligopolists. According to this view, oligopol-
ists determine base prices after taking account of the indirect as well as the direct effects of their
decisions. If this is correct, it means that conspiracy on pricing methods makes it possible for oligopolists
to exert the influence on prices that according to Chamberlin they will exert if they behave rationally;
that is, conspiracy enables them to act according to the oligopoly principle. See The Law and Economics
Of Basing Points, supra, esp. 439.
Corwin Edwards, an able exponent of basing point theory and practice, falls between the two schools.
See his Basing Point Decisions and Business Practices, 38 Am. EcoN. Rav. 828-842 (948); Doing Busi-
ness Under the Present Law About Delivered Prices, speech before the Philadelphia Chamber of Com-
merce, January 25, r949; Trends in the Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Laws, speech before the
American Business Law Institute, New York City, December 28, 1949; The Eflect of Concentration of
Economic Power, speech before the Institute of Economics and Finance, Occidental College, Los Angeles,
January 28, 595o. He recognizes that conspiracy frequently accompanies basing point pricing but he
rejects mandatory f.o.b. pricing as a remedy, and he makes some nice distinctions that neither the
Mund-Fetter nor Clark group makes. Apart from problems of price discrimination, as to which he
does not think the basing point system raises problems different from those raised elsewhere, he regards
the main issue as whether or not basing point pricing results only from conspiracy or whether it may
originate in independent action. He thinks that rigorous competition, independent oligopolistic pricing,
and conspiracy might all lead to identical delivered pricing at any point (but he thinks markets are
so imperfect that price identities under competition are likely to be recurrent rather than continuous).
But he thinks that price behavior will differ under the three circumstances. Under competition any
rival may initiate a change and price changes are likely to occur frequently. Under non-collusive
oligopoly any seller may initiate a price change--for fear a rival will if he doesn't, even though he
knows his rival will follow-but price changes will be made more reluctantly and less frequently than
under competition. Under a conspiratorial basing point system-the essence of which is an allocation
of the right to take the lead in price changes-the same mills will always initiate changes and, because
they know others will never lead but will always follow, prices are apt to be higher and more stable
than under either competition or non-collusive oligopolistic pricing.
2, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
u Letter of May 17, 1934, from John Treanor to B. H. Rader, Chairman of the Code Authority for
the Cement Industry, Respondent's Brief, p. 127, Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
157 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 7 th 1946).
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Do you think any of the arguments for the basing-point system which we have thus
far advanced will arouse anything but derision in and out of government? I have read
them all recently. Some of them are very clever and ingenious. They amount to this
however: that we price that way in order to discourage monopolistic practices and to
preserve free competition, etc. This is sheer bunk and hypocrisy. The trith is of course
-and there can be no serious, respectable discussion of our case unless this is acknowl-
edged-that ours is an industry above all others that cannot stand free competition, that
must systematically restrain competition or be ruined.
Mr. Treanor recognized that the systematic restraint of competition required
concerted action. He denied the "spontaneous evolutionary" doctrine in stating that
cooperation cannot always "be left to the mutual spontaneous adoption of considerate
policies on the part of each and every competitor. . . The practical need for
argument, persuasion, conferences, exchange of assurances, soon appears." He
laments that by "gradual steps even the most righteous upholder of the laws, find-
ing himself in a competitive industry, may also find himself drawn into the realm
of law evasion, or even of downright law violation in the form of deliberate price
fixing. ' 2
6
Concerted action to restrict competition in the cement industry began early in
this century and continued, though with interruptions, at least until the Federal
Trade Commission instituted its proceedings in July, 1937. Concerted action, al-
though not always formal, expressed itself through the following organizations or
instruments: (i) Association of American Portland Cement Manufacturers, 1902-
1916; (z) Association of Licensed Cement Manufacturers, 19o7-i9i; (3) Portland
Cement Association, ig96-i919; (4) Cement Manufacturers Protective Association,
1916-I922; (5) Cement Institute, 1929-1937; (6) N.R.A. Code Authority, 1933-1935;
(7) "Compendium of Established Terms and Marketing Methods," 1935-1937."'
Some of these agencies operated only in particular geographic areas; others
operated nationally; some were encouraged or even authorized by the government;
others ran afoul of the law; some operated a short time, others a long time. But
whether national or regional, legal or illegal, long- or short-lived, each and all at
one time or another sponsored joint action to restrict competition in the sale of
cement. They led to understandings-specific or tacit-covering basing point pric-
ing; the use of freight books showing freight rates or "common freight factors"
from production centers to all delivery points; restrictions in the use of trucks for
delivering cement; standardization of cement; diversion of shipments; standard-
ization of trade practices; and the exchange of trade statistics."' These understand-
"Brief in Support of Complaint, Vol. II, p. 261, The Cement Institute, Docket No. 3167, 37
F. T. C. 87 (1943).
"
7 The dates indicate either the life span of the organization or the period during which producers
cooperated to limit competition. I have arbitrarily assumed that concerted action stopped when the
Federal Trade Commission instituted proceedings against the Cement Institute in July, 1937. Actually
the Institute was still in existence when the circuit court handed down its decision in Aetna Portland
Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 157 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
"SSee The Cement Institute, 37 F. T. C. 87, 543-56x (1943); United States v. Cement Mfs' Pro-
tective Ass'n, 294 Fed. 390 (S. D. N. Y. x923), generally, and see for freight factors: The Cement Insti-
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ings facilitated if they did not insure the quotation of identical prices by all sellers
of cement at any point of delivery. They also contributed to an esprit de corps,
a code of ethics, which made the non-conformist a "chiseler," held in about the
same esteem by his associates as a labor "scab" by the union. They tended to con-
vert basing point pricing from a method of quoting prices into a system for stabiliz-
ing them. They apparently offer a more adequate explanation of the initiation and
operation of basing point pricing in cement than economic theory alone has provided.
B. Collaboration in Steel Pricing
The record of concerted action in the steel industry is as notorious as that of
cement, although perhaps less well authenticated. But whatever its legal status,
concerted action has helped greatly to insure the use of basing point pricing as a
device for restricting competition in the sale of steel. As with cement, so with
steel, the record of concerted action in pricing dates back a half-century. It includes
pooling arrangements; trade meetings; the famous Gary dinners; Pittsburgh Plus;2 9
an N.R.A. Code of Fair Competition administered by the American Iron and Steel
Institute, providing specifically for basing point pricing, designating the basing
points, and fining those who violated the Code's provisions; 0 collaboration in estab-
lishing base prices; 31 compilation of freight-rate books showing freight from pro-
duction centers to delivery points;12 prescription of arbitrary rates because of the
tute, supra, at 143, 162§ ., United States v. Cement Mfrs' Protective Ass'n, supra; trucking: Petitioner's
Brief, Appendix A, Vol. III, pp. 1401-1694, x834, I851-186o, 212, Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n, 157 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), Commission's Brief, pp. 130-161, Aetna Port-
land Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra, The Cement Institute, supra, at i9i-i95; diversion:
The Cement Institute, supra, at 199; exchange of trade statistics: United States v. Cement Mfrs' Pro-
tective Ass'n, supra, at 391; Petitioner's Brief, Appendix A, Vol. I, pp. 557 ff.; Aetna Portland Cement
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra, id., Vol. IV, pp. 256o, 2597-2598; identical prices basing-point
system: Petitioner's Brief, Appendix A, Vol. 1, pp. 135-136, Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, supra; United States v. Cement Mfrs' Protective Ass'n, supra, at 395.
"0 See United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417 (1920). Concerning Pitts-
burgh Plus, Judge Gary stated:
"It was deemed necessary for the orderly conduct of the business to have one basing price . . . so
that every user of steel all over the country bought and used his steel on a certain basis, knowing in
advance that everyone else who bought steel had to pay exactly as he did, with the addition of the
increased freight depending upon where he wanted to use the steel." United States Steel Corporation,
8 F. T. C. 1. 33 (1924)-
"I NRA, CODES or FaIR COMPETITION, passim, esp. 189, 198 (1933). Cf. also FTC, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE ORDER OP MAY 30, 1934, WITH RESPECT TO THE BASING
POINT SYSTEMs IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY (935); FTC, REPORT ON THE STEEL CODE TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SENATE PURSUANT TO SENATE XESoLUTION No. 166 5-8 (1934)-
" FTC, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, op. cit. supra, note 30; FTC, REPORT ON THE SaEL CODE, op.
cit. supra, note 30.
'2 Benjamin F. Fairless, Chairman of the Board, United States Steel Corporation, testified before the
TNEC that:
"The American Iron and Steel Institute has a traffic committee composed of traffic managers of io
different steel companies. This committee supervises the institute's Freight Rate Book . . . and the
responsibility of keeping these sections up to date is assigned to different members of the committee.
When corrections are necessary-and by necessary I mean when rate changes take place-these com-
mittee members have the changes made on supplementary sections or pages, sending these sections or
pages to the institute for distribution to holders of the rate book." Hearings before the TNEC, pt. 27,
7 6th Cong., 3 d Sess. 14222-14223 (1940).
See also letter presented in Commission's Brief, pp. 171-172, quoted in FRiTz MAcim.uP, THE BASING-
POINT SYSTEM 128 n. (1949).
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diversity of switching charges; 3 collaboration in determining the price of "extras"; 4
and ratification of a resolution on the death of NIRA to maintain the standards of
fair competition as set forth in the Code.35
As with cement, so with steel, the government at times has encouraged, even
required, concerted action to limit competition. As with cement, so with steel,
collaborative action has been an educational process designed to insure uniform
and predictable behavior by rival sellers under the leadership of the United States
Steel Corporation. 6 Industry members have tried to educate themselves and each
other to behave as economists have argued that informed, intelligent oligopolists
will behave. But education has not been enough, and when the going has gotten
rough "chiselers," even when faced with formal machinery designed to prevent it,
have upset a precarious equilibrium at prices above competitive levels.
C. Freight Equalization in Selling Bottle Caps
Crown bottle caps consist of cork discs enclosed in metal shells. Bottling in-
dustries use them to close bottles. Their manufacture and sale does not conform
exactly to Clark's specifications of industries that fall naturally into a basing point
pricing pattern, but it comes close to doing so. It may differ in that crown bottle
caps are light and freight charges are a relatively unimportant part of delivered
costs.37 But caps are standardized and a small difference in price will shift business
from one supplier to another. Demand for bottle caps is derived from the demand
for the bottled beverages whose containers they cap and is therefore highly inelastic.
The price of the cap is such a small part of the price of the bottled beverage that
a large percentage drop in the price of caps would probably bring no increase in
their use. Their production is highly mechanized, and operation below plant
capacity probably results in constant marginal costs substantially below total unit
costs throughout the normal range of operations. Price competition during periods
of slack demand, therefore, is apt to be "ruinous," i.e., it is likely to drive prices
3 Exhibit No. 2206, Hearings before the TNEC, pt. 27, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 14435 (1940). Also,
Wooden and White, An Analysis of the Basing Point System of Delivered Prices as Presented by the
United States Steel Corporation in Exhibits Nos. 141o and z418, in Tin BASING PoINT PROBLEM 94
(TNEC Monograph 42, 1941).
"Cf. testimony of Benjamin F. Fairless, in Hearings before the TNEC, pt. 1g, 76th Cong., 2d Sess.
10560 (1940).
5 5Mr. James Brackett of the United States Steel Corporation wrote the Executive Secretary of the
Temporary National Economic Committee on December 18, 1939, that so far as he knew the 1935
policy had not been modified. See Hearings before the TNEC, pt. 27, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 14232 ff.
(1940); see also, Wooden and White, supra note 33.
"Eugene G. Grace, President of the Bethlehem Steel Co., and of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
on November 9, 1939 testified before the Temporary National Economic Committee that ". . . one of the
principal factors which we have in that process of reaching decisions as to what we will do sales-wisc
as a rule has been the announcement of the Steel Corporation from time to time periodically as to
what their prices are to be." Hearings before the TNEC, pt. 19, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. io586 (1940).
He also stated that during the 1938 depression, when competition had forced actual steel prices below
quoted prices, he ". . . was very glad . . . of the opportunity to follow the Corporation's lead in the
publishing of new base prices, which they did. I was glad to see that take place. I thought then it
was constructive and a good thing to do." Id. at 10592.
a This is a question of fact about which I am not sure. Data are not available to answer it.
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well below total unit costs. And finally, a few sellers dominate the business.
Crown Cork & Seal has about 50 per cent of the market. With six others, it con-
trols 85 per cent.
Here then is an industry where the likelihood of pricing in accordance with the
"oligopoly principle" is great. On purely theoretical grounds producers might be
expected to refrain from active price competition without resorting to conspiracy.
Moreover conspiracy is easy to conceal, and an order forbidding it hard to enforce.
How in fact have manufacturers priced bottle caps? Have they conspired in
doing so? Both the Commission and the circuit court have answered these ques-
tions3 They found that since 1921 manufacturers have quoted prices for bottle
caps f.o.b. their plants. All have equalized delivered prices at any delivery point
at any time, absorbing freight when necessary to do so. Although sometimes
referred to as "universal freight equalization," this method of selling works like
basing point pricing with every production center a basing point. From 1938 to
1948 all producers sold bottle caps at identical and unchanging prices 9 All sellers
also used identical schedules of discounts, additions, and differentials. Since all
buyers at any delivery point were always quoted the same delivered price regardless
of from whom they bought, they apparently could not influence prices by turning
from one seller to another. Without proof of any express agreement to charge
uniform base prices, the Commission found "that the respondents have in fact
entered into ... and carried out an understanding, agreement, combination or
conspiracy ... to restrain and suppress competition in the sale of their products. 4
What was the circumstantial evidence to support the finding? In 1925 the lead-
ing manufacturers of bottle caps organized themselves into a trade association.
Shortly thereafter, through the efforts of the association, all members standardized
their bottle caps even to colored decorations. At an early meeting of the association,
members discussed ways of insuring that all would charge the same delivered price
for their standardized product. They decided that the best way to do this was to
incorporate a schedule of deductions, additions, and differentials into a standard
form of contract. The members, however, never formally adopted a standard con-
tract. In truth, they have since used no contract form but have quoted prices
informally by correspondence or through oral negotiation. In 1933, Crown Cork
& Seal licensed most other manufacturers to use its patents and the licensees agreed
not to sell caps for less than Cro vn Cork & Seal did. To aid them in complying
with the arrangement, Crown Cork & Seal supplied each licensee with its price
list. Moreover, it adjusted a patent lawsuit with one of its rivals by an exchange
of licenses and, although neither litigant used the other's patents, each thereafter
exchanged price lists. Crown Cork & Seal continued to furnish its rivals with its
price list until shortly before the Commission began its proceedings against the
"s Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 176 F. 2d 974 (C. C. A. 4th 1949).
"0 Before this period price changes were infrequent, and with minor variations all sellers charged
the same price.
"0 Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 176 F. 2d 974, 977 (C. C. A. 4 th 1949).
170 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
industry in 1941. As previously stated, all sellers for more than a decade charged
precisely the same delivered price to any designated point.
The Commission concluded from all these circumstances that "an understanding
or agreement under which the respondents acted and still act in concert may be
inferred."'" In supporting the Commission's findings the circuit court, quoting
from Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,42 said: "The essential
combination or conspiracy may be found in a course of dealings or other circum-
stances as well as in any exchange of words."
In view of all the circumstances of this case, a wayfaring economist, making an
excursion into a legal maze, may perhaps be justified in concluding that the Com-
mission's and the court's findings make sense.
In other industries using basing point pricing, against which the Commission
has proceeded, the evidence of conspiracy has been even more specific and more
convincing.4"
D. The Glucose Cases
In only two cases where the Commission has condemned basing-point pricing
has conspiracy not been charged and proven. These are the so-called glucose cases.
In these cases the Commission proceeded under the price-discrimination prohibitions
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The essential facts in the Corn Products Refining
Company case follow.44 The Corn Products Refining Company made glucose in
two plants-one at Chicago, the other in Kansas City. It quoted prices for any
delivery point, whether the sale was from Chicago or Kansas City, at the Chicago
base price plus rail freight from Chicago. As a result, on sales to buyers from its
Kansas City plant, when located freightwise nearer Kansas City than to Chicago,
the company charged a so-called "phantom-freight." On sales from its Kansas City
plant to buyers freightwise nearer Chicago than Kansas City it absorbed freight.
Thus its mill-nets (corresponding to an f.o.b. price at Kansas City) varied with the
location of the buyers. Buyers close to the Kansas City plant frequently paid more
for glucose than more remote buyers. The Commission found that such price
discrimination injured competition among candy manufacturers, some of whom
had been forced to relocate at or near Chicago in order to survive. The Commis-
sion held that such price discrimination violated the Robinson-Patman Act and
forbade it. A similar principle was involved in the Staley case.4,' In both cases,
1 d. at 976.
,1 156 F. 2d 899, 905 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
"3United States Steel Corporation, 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 324 U. S. 726 (I945); Federal Trade Comm'n v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746
(1945); Federal Trade Comm'n v. The Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948); Triangle Conduit and
Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, x68 F. 2d 175 (C. C. A. 7th 1948), aff'd per curiam sub Nom.
Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 U. S. 956 (1949); United States Maltsters Ass'n
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 152 F. 2d x6i (C. C. A. 7th 1945); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 156 F. 2d 899 (C. C. A. 7 th 1946); Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 152 F. 2d 478 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
"Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U. S. 726 (1945).
' Federal Trade Comm'n v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945).
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basing point pricing injured competition among the buyers of glucose. While these
cases did not involve a charge of conspiracy, the history of the glucose industry
reveals a long record of concerted action to eliminate price competition46 and, had
it chosen, the Commission might have proceeded in the glucose cases under Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Certainly such facts as are available regarding concerted action by business rivals
using basing-point pricing lends little support to the doctrine of spontaneous evo-
lution. Even where sellers are few, and a rational consideration for the total con-
sequences of their decisions would be expected to lead to pricing on the "oligopoly
principle" without any collusion, they have in fact found concerted action essential
to restrain price competition.
III
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF BASING POINT PRICING
The economic consequences of basing-point pricing are as important to sound
public policy toward it as are the factors that have brought it about. The accept-
ability of any "competitive" arrangement depends on whether or not other arrange-
ments would work better. There are three practical alternatives: (I) mandatory
f.o.b. pricing; (2) basing point pricing maintained through concerted action-overt
or tacit; and (3) non-conspiratorial pricing with sellers free to sell as they wish, even
to absorbing freight, subject only to rules laid down by Congress designed to
preserve competition.
For three reasons this study rejects mandatory f.o.b. pricing. In the first place,
as long as the organization and control of those industries practicing basing point
pricing is undisturbed, and as long as industries are as free as they have been to
act concertedly rather than independently on prices and production policies, man-
datory f.o.b. pricing will not necessarily make competition more effective than it
has been in basing point industries. Businessmen can agree on marketing areas as
well as on pricing policies. Unless restrained from doing so, they might work
out understandings, more or less tacit, about where each will sell and at what prices.
Price leadership might be as effective under f.o.b. pricing as under basing point
pricing. Oligopolistic behavior (that is the tendency for rivals to take account of
the indirect as well as the direct consequences of their decisions) can be supple-
" See MYRON WATINS, INDusTmIA. COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY, C. X (1927); FTC, Corn
Products Refining Co., Docket No. 5502, Complaint, June 2o, 1947; Docket No. 927, November, 1922;
United States v. Corn Derivatives Institute, consent decree, 1932; Complaint, Docket No. 3633, October,
1938; Complaints, Docket Nos. 3798, 3799, 3800, 380, 3802, 3803, 3804, 3805, June, 1939; Cease
and Desist Order, Docket No. 3798, September 26, 1940; also Cease and Desist Orders Nos. 3802, Nov.
2, 1940, 3804, December 11, 1940, 3805, March 15, 1941, 38o, April 3, 1941, 3800, March 17, 1942,
and 3803, June io, 1942. For the court rulings, see Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
144 F. 2d 211 (C. C. A. 7th 1944); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 144 F. 2d 221
(C. C. A. 7th 1944); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U. S. 726 (1945);
Federal Trade Comm'n v. A. E. Staley Mfg. CO., 324 U. S. 746 (1945). Also see Motion to Dismiss
Complaint, Corn Products Refining Co., before the Federal Trade Comm'n, Docket No. 5502, September,
1948.
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mented by concerted action to curb competition under either mandatory f.o.b. sell-
ing or basing point pricing4 7 In the second place, if mandatory f.o.b. pricing should
not be accompanied by tacit agreements, marketing areas, and the like, it might
seriously disturb ihe pattern of plant location that has developed under basing point
pricing, encouraging plant expansion in new areas and forcing sharp devaluation
of plant and equipment in areas of surplus capacity. In the long run this would
be economical, but its immediate effects might be disturbing, particularly if and when
business activity generally declines.4 In the third place, to tell businessmen that
they must price their products f.o.b. when in their individual judgment freight
absorption might prevent bankruptcy or enhance their profits, seems inconsistent
with the function of the entrepreneur in a competitive society. Positive state inter-
ference of this sort is apt to lead to the government's assuming further responsibility
in the guidance of individual enterprise. Eventually the government may so en-
croach on individual liberty in business matters that it has no alternative but to
take over industry.
Let us consider then alternatives (2) and (3). Non-conspiratorial pricing with
individual firms free to sell with the right to absorb freight if they want to as long
as they do not violate rules laid down by Congress to preserve competition, appar-
ently has two advantages over conspiratorial basing point pricing. (i) Except at
the height of a business boom when capacity is fully utilized, it would make for
lower prices and it would probably make for more flexible prices at all times.
(2) It would tend to insure a more economical use of resources.
A. Basing Point System Makes for Higher Prices
A characteristic of the major industries which have relied on basing point pricing
along with a lot of complementary paraphernalia to restrain competition is that they
have operated below full capacity over long periods. This is true of the cement
and steel industries, both of which operated well below capacity throughout the
period between the two world wars. The object of concerted action has been to
keep cost-price margins high-that is, higher than they would have been in the
4 There is an important distinction between the above argument and that of Clark. See Clark,
Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CAN. J. EcoN. AND POL. Se. 477 (938). Clark thinks that
if businessmen are required to sell f.o.b. they may for a brief period engage in ruinous competition, after
which they will discover some other arrangement that will more adequately protect their interest. The
above argument does not imply that businessmen should not be prevented from conspiring in one way
merely because they might find some other way to conspire. The problem is to find a way to prevent
conspiracy, not a way to enforce f.o.b. selling.
If Stigler is correct in his theory that geographic fluctuation in demand is the main force behind
basing point pricing arrangements, it would be difficult for rivals to work out acceptable agreements
on market areas. I think it would be difficult even though I do not accept fully Stigler's theory, but I
do not think it would be impossible.
" The argument that mandatory f.o.b. pricing should not be required merely because it may correct
a pattern of location which has arisen as a result of arbitrary pricing of another sort is not of itself
compelling. But the third alternative offers a better way of doing the same job. There are other
reasons for rejecting mandatory f.o.b. pricing. See Kaysen, Basing Point Pricing and Public Policy, 63
Q. J. ECON. 289 (1949), who develops a convincing argument that f.o.b. pricing is unlikely to make
prices more flexible or lower than basing point pricing.
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absence of concerted action. To do this, both industries formulated specific trade
practices and encouraged self-discipline through a code of business ethics designed
to reinforce the "natural" tendency of an oligopolist to take account of his rivals'
probable reactions in formulating his own business policies. While this did not
always prevent "chiseling" and at times not even an erosion of the price structure,
the very fact that business leaders persisted in it over long periods indicates that
it paid off. Businessmen do not surrender their individual discretion on pricing
and production policies for the fun of it. They have tried to advance their indi-
vidual interests by promoting the interest of their group.
In oligopolistic markets any seller, of course, may be reluctant to cut prices be-
cause he fears that his rivals will promptly meet the cut. When sellers are acting
independently, this fear may not prevent some producer, because of the urgency
of his needs or the temporary advantage he hopes to gain, from initiating a price
cut which others may be forced to follow.
But oligopolists acting independently may be equally reluctant to raise prices,
except in periods of capacity operation, for fear their rivals will not follow. The
basing point system removes this fear. Where faithfully followed, basing point
pricing enables any base mill to raise prices with the knowledge that other mills
will not sell for less in the area where its base price governs. At most the price in-
crease will have broadened the area within which other base prices govern and the
area within which the other mills can profitably absorb freight. If other base mills
follow the price increase, the initiator need suffer no loss of business to rivals. In
technical language, basing point pricing may be a means of eliminating the "kink"
in the demand curve facing an oligopolist 9
This helps to explain why cement producers raised base prices of cement in the
second half of 1932 and the first half of 1933 despite a drastic decline in demand.
That the steel industry's pricing methods have kept steel prices abnormally high
is suggested by the slight response that changes in the percentage of capacity at
which the industry has operated have brought in the price of steel. With the in-
dustry operating at 98 per cent of its steel ingot capacity in 1942, average de-
livered prices actually paid for hot rolled sheets were ioi per cent of published
delivered prices; for cold sheets, ioi per cent; for hot rolled strips, ioo per cent;
for plates, io2 per cent; and for structural shapes, io per cent. Three years earlier,
in the second quarter of 1939, with the industry operating at only 51 per cent of'
its steel ingot capacity, and published prices substantially the same, on the average an
8 per cent concession from published delivered prices was made for hot rolled
sheets; a 5 per cent concession for cold rolled sheets; an 8 per cent concession for hot
rolled strips; and only a 3 per cent concession each for plates and for structural
shapes.' °
4g See Sweezy, Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568 (1939).
o Fazar and Bean, Labor Department Examines Consumers' Prices of Steel Products, 157 IRo.; AGF
118-145 (April 25, 1946); and Kaysen, supra note 48, at 298.
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Steel prices were so high in 1938, a year of depression, that the Steel Corporation
could break even while operating at from 40-45 per cent of capacity."1
B. Basing Point System Makes for Higher Costs
But not only does systematic and concerted basing point pricing make for higher
margins than would prevail without it, it also tends to keep costs high. Two factors
contribute to this. In the first place, when price competition is eliminated in the
sale of a standardized product, business rivals must rely largely on sales effort to
obtain business. Since salesmen may perform other functions besides trying to
get orders-as for example, the actual taking of orders, giving advice on specifica-
tions and on the adaptability of a product for a particular use, etc.-not all expense
for salesmen represents an added cost. However, when the new manager of the
Bay City, Michigan plant of the Aetna Portland Cement Company abandoned price
cutting in 1936, following a protest from its trade rivals to the president of Aetna
and the firing of its old manager, and. began to sell "according to the ethics of the
industry," he had to increase his sales force "in the process of getting business on a
new basis."52
Even oligopolists who are free to sell as they see fit, if they quit acting in con-
cert and make their own decisions, are likely to be forced to rely more on price
than on sales effort to get business. At times, however, they no doubt will reach
out for business by absorbing freight in preference to cutting their f.o.b. price which
would ordinarily govern the bulk of their sales. When they do, they may prefer
to meet their rivals' delivered price rather than to cut below it. They are therefore
likely to use some salesmen to get business, but getting sales through freight ab-
sorption is a game two can play. Since freight absorption means lowered mill nets,
if they do not conspire to prevent it, rival sellers are likely to be driven, whether
they like it or not, to rely more on price to get business than they would under
concerted basing point pricing. It seems reasonable to conclude that non-conspiratorial
pricing will reduce selling costs somewhat.
But increased reliance on price to get business will tend to lower costs in another
way. Business firms -will be forced to cut costs or go into bankruptcy. Basing
point pricing through concerted action permits high cost producers to live and
weakens the incentive of both high and low-cost producers to reduce costs. A price
leader committed to the philosophy of live-and-let-live is apt to be more concerned
with keeping his investments intact through price controls and his followers in
line than in placing himself in a position to bankrupt them by cutting prices. Ex-
penditures for group activities--compilation of freight rate books, joint determina-
tion of the costs of "extras in steel," joint advertising to increase the use of the
" See UNITED STATES STEEL CoRroRA'IoN, TMC PAPERs, Vol. II, Chart Studies, p. 57 (1940).
After mid-i938 price reductions, United States Steel fixed the break-even point at 5o-55 per cent of
capacity. See id. at 63.
Burns notes a report that in 1934 steel prices were such that the industry could obtain profits if
they operated at 50 per cent of capacity. A. R. BuRNs, Tim DECLINE OF COMsPETITION 543 (i936).
5 The Cement Institute, 37 F. T. C. 87, 190-191 (1943).
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product, nurturing the cooperative spirit, and the like, are apt to replace in part,
at any rate, expenditures for lowering costs and improving the product.
That something like this has happened to Big Steel is suggested by its continued
loss of relative position in steel production from its organization to World War II.
In 192, the United States Steel Corporation produced 65.7 per cent of the total
domestic tonnage of steel ingots and castings. In 1937, it produced only 36.8 per
cent. In 1902, it produced 654 per cent of Bessemer steel rail tonnage, 59.4 per cent
of plates and sheets, and 71.5 per cent of wire rods. In 1937, it produced only 35.2
per cent of all rolled and finished products.
The Corporation's concern with protecting property values by keeping prices
high has been notorious. In the words of Fortune:53
The fact that the Corporation, simply because of the magnitude of its conception, had
from the beginning so many hundreds of millions of its dollars in plant worked strongly
against change. And so the chief energies of the men who guided the Corporation were
directed to preventing deterioration in the investment value of the enormous properties
confided to their care. To achieve this, they constantly tried to freeze the steel industry
at present, or better yet, past levels.
As late as 1938, the Corporation's subsidiaries are said to have lacked a compre-
hensive system of modern cost accounting and to have had cost and production con-
trol methods far below the customary standards in other industries. According to
Fortune, as of 1936 the Corporation had contributed very little to the art of steel
making and the steel industry was one of the most technologically backward of
our major industries.
Both costs and cost-price margins are likely to be higher in industries using a
basing point system to restrict competition than they would be without concerted
action. Prices therefore could scarcely yield monopoly results-i.e., maximize earn-
ings. In truth, a live-and-let-live policy may even be extended to include an in-
dustry's customers. At any rate, as previously indicated, Clark finds that in
establishing base prices in cement, price leaders have tried merely to obtain a fair
return on their investment.5 4 According to an analysis of prices, costs, and profits
jointly prepared by Price, Waterhouse & Co. and Ford Bacon & Davis and offered
by respondents as evidence in proceedings before the Commission but refused by
the Commission, the respondents earned on actual cost of assets an average of less
than 3 per cent over the ten year period, I98-37. 5
C. Basing Point Pricing Has Meant An Uneconomical Use of Resources
Both the cement and steel industries had a lot of unused capacity in good years
and bad throughout the period between the two wars. Unused capacity in cement
" Fortune, March, 1936, p. xO. According to Fortune, the steel industry as of 1936 was one of
the most backward of our major industries.
"Clark, Basing Point Methods of Pice Quoting, 4 CAN. J. EcoN. AND POL. SMc. 477 (1938).
"See Brief for Respondents, p. 241, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683
(1948).
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ranged from 15 per cent of the total in 1924 to 77 per cent in 1933. Unused steel
ingot capacity ranged from 80.5 per cent in 1932 to 35.3 per cent in 1939. The
restriction on price competition that basing point pricing exerted under these cir-
cumstances tended to make for an uneconomical use of resources in two ways:
(i) It has tended to keep surplus resources in the industry and to prevent their
being used economically; and (2) it has tended to insure an uneconomic use of
transportation facilities.
It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the circumstances that resulted
continuously in unused capacity in cement and steel during the period under review.
Capacity is not a very precise term and the figures-although based on the industry's
own calculations-may be somewhat misleading. Moreover, the figures are average
annual figures. Demand for both cement and steel may fluctuate seasonally and
geographically, and hence over-all annual figures may conceal the fact that at cer-
tain times and in certain places plants were operating very much closer to capacity
than the annual figures reveal. Recognizing this fact, it nevertheless seems reason-
able to conclude that these two industries suffered from a surplus of facilities or
from an underuse of facilities from 1920 to 1940. In short, resources were not used
economically in these industries. By restricting output through concerted action
business leaders were able to shift the burden of unused capacity from the industry
to the public. This is reflected in the 3 per cent earnings of the cement industry
during the period 1928-37, and a return of about 3.4 per cent on net assets of the
United States Steel Corporation during the period from 1920 to 1938.0" When
viewed from the interests of these industries, this moderate rate of return suggests
that price leaders have exercised such discretionary controls as they possess with
considerable restraint, as does the fact that steel in post-war markets has continuously
sold for less through the regular channels of trade than it has in the "gray" markets.
Nevertheless, even the moderate rate of returns realized over the period between
the two wars is difficult to justify on strictly economic grounds. Continuous surplus
capacity in an effectively competitive economy would have tended to drive prices so
far below total unit cost as to shrink capacity. That steel ingot capacity increased
by about 30 per cent from 1920 to 1939 and cement capacity increased by about 74
per cent suggests strongly that discretionary controls raised prices above a socially
justifiable level. In view of the difficulty of shifting such highly specialized and fixed
capital as is found in cement and steel, it is quite possible that below-cost prices would
not have established a long-run "competitive equilibrium" within the period under
review. Possibly, also, without any concerted action, rational oligopolistic behavior
would have checked a price decline above the level of marginal costs. This analysis
indicates that prices in the absence of concerted action, however, would have been
lower than they have in fact been. The most important consequence of lower prices
in these industries throughout the i93o's would probably have been a different dis-
tribution of income, a redistribution more favorable to spending and less favorable
" Exhibit No. 1391, Hearings before the TNEC, pt. i9, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 10717 (1940).
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to saving; and, since. this was a period of under-investment, more favorable to a
high level of employment and a high level of national income. The redistribution,
moreover, would have reflected more accurately the unobstructed evaluation of buy-
ers of the services rendered by cement and steel producers. Lower prices through-
out this period would probably have increased somewhat the use of these products
and thereby increased the real income of the community.
A defense offered by some economists for the maintenance of surplus capacity
in steel and cement is that a smaller capacity would have seriously embarrassed us
in the emergency of World War II. As for cement, this is not true. Only since
the war has the cement industry operated at capacity. The steel shortage during
World War II would have been more serious had steel prices sunk so low during
the interval between the wars as to have reduced capacity. It is doubtful that non-
conspiratorial oligopolistic pricing would have forced such low levels, but even if
it had, it is no convincing argument for leaving price-making to the joint discretion-
ary controls of a relatively few private producers. To shape an economy for war
calls for a different type of control than to shape it for peace. Few policy makers
in a democracy will want to rely on private arbitrary price making to insure
adequate facilities to fight a world war. Planning for total war is a public not a
private matter. It is total not fragmentary planning.
D. Basing Point Pricing Has Retarded Expansion of Low-Cost Facilities
But basing point pricing as a means of restricting competition in an industry
organized and controlled as is the steel industry has resulted in an uneconomical
use of facilities in a more specific way. It has retarded the expansion of facilities
that could most economically serve particular geographic areas, for the benefit of
facilities less favorably located. 7  For example, basing point pricing in steel has
enabled Chicago and Pittsburgh producers to supply continuously markets for cer-
tain steel products that could be laid down for less by the Birmingham producers.
Birmingham is a low-cost producing area. It is the only important producing center
which contains within the immediate area adequate supplies of the essential raw
materials-iron ore, coking coal, and lime for fluxing. It can supply not only the
Texas market by cheap water transportation but the Atlantic Coast and Western
markets as well. Naturally it could be expected to supply not only its home markets
but other nearby markets. That it has not been permitted to do "what comes
naturally" is indicated by data covering all shipments of heavy structural shapes
during the month of February, 1939, by mills owning 8i per cent of total domestic
capacity.r s During this month, Birmingham received from all sources included in
the sample 1,623 tons of heavy structural steel shapes. Birmingham mills supplied
" For an excellent discussion of this aspect of the problem, see Johnson, The Restrictive Incidence of
Basing Point Pricing on Regional Development, 37 Gao. L. J. 149 (949); and Edwards, Geographic
Price Formulas and the Concentration of Economic Power, id. at 135.
" These data are obtained from unpublished returns from questionnaire Form B submitted by the
TNEC. For a description of this questionnaire and a statement of its coverage, see Hearings before the
TNEC, pt. 27, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 14133 fl. and 14350 (1940).
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only 1,017 tons of this, or 63 per cent of the total. Far away Chicago supplied 453
tons, the more remote Pittsburgh-Johnstown area supplied 122 tons, and even most
distant eastern Pennsylvania supplied 31 tons. Average freight costs on shipments
by Birmingham producers to buyers in that area were 94 cents a ton; for Chicago
shipments $11.62 a ton; for Pittsburgh-Johnstown, $12.81 a ton; and for eastern
Pennsylvania, $15.16 a ton. Basing point pricing made deliveries profitable to re-
mote producers but it prevented the most economical use of the best situated facilities.
Birmingham with its home markets thus invaded, sought business elsewhere.
It turned to nearby Texas where again it had a substantial delivered-cost advantage
over rival producers. Nevertheless, although operating well below capacity during
the period under review, Birmingham supplied only 467 tons of the total Texas
market of 3,788 tons during February, 1939. The Rocky Mountain area, Chicago,
Pittsburgh-Johnstown, Buffalo, and St. Louis supplied the balance in that order.
The delivered price was high enough to make it profitable for such remote suppliers
to reach the Texas markets by absorbing substantial amounts of freight. Average
actual freight charges on shipments from Birmingham were $11.04 a ton; from
eastern Pennsylvania, $12.49 a ton; from the mountain states, $13.22 a ton; from St.
Louis, $4i.x a ton; from Chicago, $5.54 a ton; from Pittsburgh-Johnstown, $x6.43
a ton; and from Buffalo, $22.23 a ton.
There can be little doubt that basing point pricing in steel-with all its com-
plementary price fixing paraphernalia-has retarded the expansion of iron and steel
producing facilities in the low-cost Birmingham region and prevented the econom-
ical use of existing facilities.
E. Basing Point Prices Make for Uneconomical Use of
Transportation Facilities
But basing point pricing has also made for an uneconomical use of transportation
facilities. Apparently Stigler overstates the case in concluding that market inter-
penetration is practically non-existent and in holding that market penetration is
primarily a result of geographical fluctuations in demand, with products flowing
from areas of low demand to areas of high demand, the direction of shipments
reversing with geographic changes in demand. Actually it has been a continuous
characteristic of cement and steel with a tendency to increase in periods of depres-
sion and to decrease in boom times.
The basing point system is designed to insure identical delivered prices by rival
producers. It encourages producers to compete for business on a service basis rather
than a price basis. It is a form of price discrimination that, when systematically
practiced by all sellers, does not seriously threaten the price structure. In periods
of generally slack demand, rival producers prefer to get business by reducing their
mill nets on a relatively small part of their total sales and by absorbing freight, than
to get it by lowering their base price to all buyers. In such periods, freight ab-
sorption increases. In boom times, when producers can get business without absorb-
ing freight, except to keep business connections they have no incentive to accept
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less on remote sales than they get on nearby sales. The post-war experience indicates
that when demand outruns supply, remote buyers may find it dificult to find a
supplier. Remote suppliers find it more profitable to accept only non-freight ab-
sorbing business. Nearby suppliers prefer to supply their old customers.
A single example will suffice to show that market interpenetration and freight
absorption have been a two-way phenomenon in normal times. The Board of
Investigation and Research discovered that during one day in November, 1939, at
least 245,38o pounds of tin plate started by rail from Baltimore to Chicago and that
on the same day at least 42,809 pounds of tin plate started by rail from Chicago
to Baltimore.r9
Basing point pricing makes for an uneconomical use of transportation facilities
in two ways. (I) It encourages needless cross-hauling by rail freight; and (2) it dis-
courages the use of cheaper modes of transportation-water and trucks.
Under a basing point system, delivered prices are quoted on a basis of railway
freight. Buyers have not generally been free in industries where basing point sys-
tems are rigidly adhered to, to buy at the plant and deliver by the cheapest method
of transportation.
Business rivals, in the absence of concerted action, would no doubt permit buy-
ers to buy f.o.b. at such prices as the sellers customarily charged and ship the product
by whatever way they chose. Business rivals no doubt also would at times prefer
to absorb freight to get business rather than to try to get it by reducing their base
prices to all comers. In oligopolistic industries, therefore, freight absorption with
price discrimination is apt to continue even without collusion among rivals, but it
is apt to be on a reduced scale.
On the whole, non-collusive, discriminatory f.o.b. pricing would likely have led
to lower-price margins, more flexible prices, lower costs, and more economical use
of production: factors during the period between the two wars than did basing point
pricing through concerted action.
IV
SHOULD THE LAv BE CHANGED?
Whether or not any change in the law is required to permit freight absorption
at the discretion of business firms acting independently will depend largely on the
wisdom with which the Federal Trade Commission uses the administrative powers
which the Congress and the courts have given it.
Despite all the furor that the Supreme Court's decision in the Cement and the
circuit court's decision in the Rigid Steel Conduit cases raised, the Commission
has tried to make it clear that it will not proceed against basing point pricing under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act unless there is evidence of collu-
sion.60 What constitutes collusion, however, may not always be dear. In all cases
" CHARLEs E. LANDON AND WILLIAM P. McLENDON, THE ECONOaIUCS OF IRON AND STEEL TRANspoRTA-
7ION 85 (1945), printed as letter from the Board of Investigation and Research transmitting A REPORT
ON TIM ECONOIMCS OF IRON Am SraL TRANSPORTATION, 79th Cong., ist Sess (1945).
" See statement of Commissioner E. L. Davis prepared for delivery before the Senate Subcommittee
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that have thus far come before the Commission under Section 5, the record has re-
vealed unmistakable evidence of concerted action. But the courts have indicated that
the pattern of pricing behavior may itself be evidence of conspiracy. The difficulty of
proving overt acts of conspiracy plus the difficulty of enforcing cease and desist orders
against a practice which conspirators have learned pays, no doubt accounts for the
Commission's having extended the scope of its charges and its orders in the Rigid
Steel Conduit case to cover parallel action by rivals when the effect of the action is to
restrict competition. 1 Some of the Commission's staff, who accept the Mund-Fetter
philosophy, are apparently convinced that parallel action by business rivals cannot
be achieved without agreement and that the only way to prevent it is to write
orders that in effect leave no means of compliance but f.o.b. selling.
If this analysis is sound, such a policy is unsound. In most cases to prohibit
conspiracy and ban the agencies through which it has been achieved should even-
tually insure independent f.o.b. pricing with sellers absorbing freight at their dis-
cretion. Where sellers are so few and so well disciplined that they will continue
to act as they have jointly disciplined themselves to act, the remedy lies not in
mandatory f.o.b. selling but in changing the structure of the industry so that business
rivals will behave like competitors. This would involve dissolution suits, and would
require cooperation between the Commission and the Department of Justice. If
the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, the courts, and the
electorate are not prepared to support such a program, the remedy obviously lies
in other directions. But it lies in other directions because society is unwilling to
pay the price of obtaining effective competition, not because it is impractical to
achieve it.6 2
If the aim of public policy is to insure effective competition in the production
and sale of commodities, the Federal Trade Commission will have to limit its attack
on basing point pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act to two sets of circum-
stances: (i) where it results in phantom freight (whether obvious or concealed in
price differentials) and injures competition among the buyers of the product as in
the Corn Products Refining Company case; and (2) where a multi-plant firm en-
gages in local price discrimination by absorbing freight, the long-run effect of which
is to lessen competition by putting a local rival out of business. Again, a wise
application of the law to predatory price cutting requires cooperation between the
Department of Justice and the Commission, for here the basic difficulty is not price
discrimination, but the concentration of economic power. Again the remedy lies in
changing the structure of the industry so that survival in the competitive struggle
rests on economic efficiency, not on financial power.
on Trade Policies (January 24, 1949); and Edwards, Basing Point Decisions and Business Practices, 38
Ams. Eco-z. tv. 828 (1948).
" See, for example, Sheehy, The Legal and Factual Content of Recent Geographic Pricing Cases, 37
Gao. L. J. 183-200, esp. 200 (1949).
2 This statement is based on the historical fact that oligopolists have generally achieved their position
in the market by merging with rivals and on the belief that they can be separated into several produc-
tion units with no loss in efficiency. Something far short of perfect competition will suffice.
